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    ABSTRACT  
 
Il saggio affronta il tema del controllo sulla predisposizione unilaterale dei 
contratti standard e degli strumenti giuridici a tal fine sviluppati sia nella 
tradizione di common law, sia in quella di civil law. In particolare, da un lato, si 
concentra sulla “Unconscionability Doctrine”, così come è stata originariamente 
recepita nell'Uniform Commercial Code statunitense e come recentemente 
sviluppata nelle decisioni dalla Corte Suprema canadese; dall'altro, esamina la 
disciplina recata dai codici civili americani del Québec e dell'Argentina in punto 
di determinazione unilaterale del contenuto del contratto da parte del 
predisponente. Infine, muovendo da alcuni casi emersi nella giurisprudenza 
italiana, ci si interroga sulle indicazioni che possono essere tratte, anche per la 
giurisdizione domestica, dalla disciplina contenuta nei codici del Québec e 
dell'Argentina (così come nel codice civile francese, recentemente novellato) per 
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la valutazione delle clausole non negoziate di determinazione unilaterale 
dell’oggetto e del contenuto giuridico del contratto standard. 
 
Parole chiave: Contratti per adesione; Condizioni generali di contratto;  
Unconscionability; Uniform Commercial Code; Corte Suprema del Canada; Codice 
civile del Québec; Codice civile e commerciale argentino. 
 
The essay addresses the control of Unnegotiated Standard Form Contracts and 
the legal tools developed for such purpose both in common and civil law 
traditions. In particular, on the one hand, it focuses on unconscionability, as it 
was originally crafted by the USA’s Uniform Commercial Code and recently 
shaped as a new doctrine by the Canadian Supreme Court; on the other hand, it 
looks to the American civil codes of Quebec and Argentina. Then it deals with 
some cases occurring in Italian case law, suggesting that the Quebec and 
Argentinian Codes (as well as the recently amended French Civil Code) could 
give guidance in assessing the enforceability of unnegotiated standard clauses 
that affect the very core of the contract and its subject matter. 
 
Keywords: Standard Form Contracts; Unconscionability; Uniform Commercial 
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Unnegotiated Contracts of Adhesion in 
American Common and Civil Law Jurisdictions: 
the Canadian and Argentinian Cases  
SOMMARIO: 1. Meeting of the minds and standard terms in contracts 
formation. – 2. The doctrine of unconscionability in North American common 
law jurisdictions. – 2.1. USA’s Uniform Commercial Code. – 2.2. The new 
Canadian doctrine of unconscionability. – 2.2.1. Hunter v. Syncrude. – 2.2.2. 
Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British Columbia. –  2.2.3. The “waiver of 
liability clause” and the “entire agreement clause” before the Court of Appeal for 
British Columbia. – 2.2.4. Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16. – 3. 
Unconscionability doctrine and Civil Code of Louisiana. – 4. American Civil 
Codes and control of the merits of the unnegotiated terms: Quebec and 
Argentina cases. – 4.1. The Quebec Civil Code. - .4.2. The Argentinian Civil and 
Commercial Code. – 5. Unnegotiated standard clauses affecting the core and 
subject matter of the contract. – 6. Some relevant Italian case law. – 6.1. The Safe 
Deposit Boxes Cases. – 6.2. Suretyships in Favor of Banks Cases. – 6.3. The 
Claims-Made Insurance Policies Cases. – 7. The French Civil Code, as amended 
in 2015. – 8. Conclusions 
1. Meeting of the minds and standard terms in contracts law 
jurisdictions. 
  Quoting an acclaimed essay written in the 1980s, we can say that civil law 
codes and common law “share a common heritage: one set of rules for the formation of 
contracts, with the implicit premise that all obligations are contracted at arm's length 
through a process of actual term-by-term bargaining by parties having relatively equal 
bargaining power. The need for mass contracting, brought about by mass production and 
mass marketing, surely undercut whatever validity that implicit premise historically may 
have enjoyed”1.   
Indeed, it is common knowledge that rules on the formation of contract in 
European (and South American) civil codes – mostly deriving from the 
Napoleonic Code – are mainly based on the interaction and exchange of ideas 
during encounters between the two or more parties involved in the contract. The 
same occurs in the few instances of civil law embedded in the east coast north 
 
(1) R. L. HERSBERGEN, Contracts of Adhesion Under the Louisiana Civil Code, in Lousiana law 
review, 1982, 43, 15.  
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American predominant common law jurisdictions, such as Quebec and 
Louisiana.  
Such a 19th-century manner of building consent – through an exchange of 
offer, acceptance or counterproposal – has been overturned (except in certain 
specific fields, such as in real estate sales to individuals) by the unilaterally 
formed standard contract, for which the economically weaker party’s sole option 
is to adhere or not to the proposed terms.  
The matter of “standard form contracts of adhesion” has been clearly 
considered by code makers in the 20th century: in the Italian Civil Code (ICC) of 
1942 the party joining a standard contract is protected from unfair standard 
terms by Art.s 1341 and 13422. This type of protection, though very up-to-date for 
that time, appears now merely formal as it relied only on specific approval in 
writing of a limited set of clauses and did (and does) not allow Italian courts to 
ascertain the fairness of the standard terms.  
However, at least a basic protection, shared by the majority of Civil Codes 
and by common law, is what the latter refers to as the contra proferentem  rule3, as 
a way to interpret and construe the adhesion contracts: as the rule is set forth in 
Louisiana’s Civil Code, following the path of many European Codes4 “A contract 
executed in a standard form of one party must be interpreted, in case of doubt, in favor of 
the other party” (Art. 2056, 2nd par.).  
But the challenges posed by adhesion contracts need more than an 
interpretation rule or some special form requirements (as the Italian Civil Code 
provides): tools are needed that can address the potential substantive unbalance 
or even inutility, for the adherent party, of a contract which clauses are 
unilaterally crafted and imposed by the drafter.  
 Considering that a more substantive protection in contracts between 
professionals  and consumers was needed, the European Union, in the late 1990s, 
developed, by means of directives which were then implemented in member 
States5, a set of rules allowing courts to control the potential imbalance and 
 
(2) On the Italian legal literature in English, see M. GRAZIADEI, Control of price related terms 
in standard form contracts: the Italian experience, in Annuario di diritto comparato e studi 
legislativi, 2018, 193 ff.  
(3) In the Canadian common law cases, see See Hillis Oil and Sales Ltd. v Wynn’s Canada 
Ltd., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 57, 68-69. 
(4) For the Italian Civil Code, see art. 1370. 
(5) Art. 3.1 of EU Directive 93/13/ of 5th April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
reads: “1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as 
unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' 
rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer”. Art. 4.1 of 
the same Directive reads: “Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the 
definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and 
remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplied in exchange, on the other, 
in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language”. 
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unfairness between rights and obligations arising from standard terms6. The 
same approach was followed in some North American Common law 
Jurisdictions, such as British Columbia, where a set of specific rules was enacted 
for consumer transactions7.  
The actual debate, in Europe, is on how to provide quite the same 
protection also in B2B contracts, as no general provision on the topic exists as yet.   
In particular, in Italy it is disputed whether the same substantial 
protection as provided for consumer contracts may be granted in business-to-
business commerce by extending the scope of Art. 9 of Law no. 192 /19988 (a 
statute preventing abuses of economic dependence in industrial subcontracting), 
suggesting it could be regarded as a general clause, although it was a rule 
established for the specific field of subcontracting. 
Indeed, even though European lawmakers had focused on the protection 
of consumers as the main issue at stake, the need for this kind of protection has 
also been seen, more recently, whenever professionals (or individuals) enter into 
contracts (formally) as peers9 but without having the same economic and 
bargaining power as their counterparty, as is the case for a small or a medium-
sized company adhering to standard contracts on the basis of the counterparty’s 
form and terms.  
 
(6) A control that targets only the juridical balance of the contract, with the express 
exemption of questioning the price and the subject matter (the goods or service rendered 
under the contract) if they are correctly expressed and disclosed. Consumer protection 
under European law has been debated and addressed by scholars starting from the main 
Directive 93/13 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract. See the debate reported in P. 
NEBBIA, Law as Tradition and the Europeanization of Contract Law: A Case Study, in Yearbook 
of European Law, 2004, 363 ff. An essay on the more specific Italian domestic case law 
concerning control over penalty clauses and liquidated damages clauses is delivered in 
English by F.P. PATTI, Penalty Clauses in Italian Law, in European Review of Private law, 2015, 
309 ff.  
(7) For British Columbia, as we will see below, reference is made to the Business Practices 
and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004. 
(8) Art. 9 of Law. no. 192 of 18th June 1998, headed “Abuse of economic dependence”, 
reads: «1. The abuse by one or more companies of the economic dependence in which, in its or in 
their regards, a client or supplier company is prohibited. The economic situation in which a 
company is able to determine, in commercial relations with another company, an excessive 
imbalance of rights and obligations is considered an economic dependency. The economic 
dependence is assessed also taking into account the real possibility for the party who has suffered 
the abuse to find satisfactory alternatives on the market. 2. The abuse can also consist in the 
refusal to sell or in the refusal to buy, in the imposition of unjustifiably burdensome or 
discriminatory contractual conditions, in the arbitrary interruption of commercial relations in 
progress. 3. The clause or agreement through which the abuse of economic dependence is done is 
void and null». 
(9) In “commercial transactions”, as opposed to “consumer transactions”, as they are 
called in British Columbia. 
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2. The doctrine of unconscionability in North American common law 
jurisdictions. 
The main tool for such control of contract power, developed in North 
American Common law jurisdictions10, appears to be the "unconscionability” 
doctrine.11 
As was noted: “In the common law jurisdictions "unconscionability" has 
emerged from Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302(1) as the principal judicial device by 
which the fairness of standard form contracts of adhesion in a consumer transaction is 
adjusted”12.  
Moving on from the end of the nineteenth century, English Courts of 
equity began to set aside agreements when they resulted from an inequality of 
bargaining power, referring to the concept of “unconscionability”13.  
The term addresses something which “affronts the sense of decency”, as it 
involves a gross overall one-sidedness of the contract or of a specific term such as 
disclaiming a warranty, limiting damages or granting procedural advantages.14 
According to Canadian case law, awareness of the vulnerability of the other 
 
(10) It is a common remark that common law jurisdictions outside the United Kingdom, 
notably Canada and the USA, are more open to establishing a general doctrine of 
unconscionability: see H. BEALE, Chitty on Contracts28, London 1999, 1, 455, referring to 
Commonwealth courts and in particular to Canadian (but also Australian) ones. As it was 
noted (S. M. WADDAMS, Unconscionability in Canadian Contract Law, in Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review, 1992, 14, 543: “English courts generally do not 
recognize unconscionability as a contractual defense. This is partly on account of the United 
Kingdom's Unfair Contract Terms Act and the general mood of judicial conservatism prevailing 
in English courts”.  
(11) Although some Canadian Scholars expressed skepticism as to the “impossible tasks that 
are delegated to the judiciary by the unconscionability doctrine” (R. A. HASSON, 
"Unconscionability in Contract Law and in the New Sales Act - Confessions of a Doubting 
Thomas " in Canadian Business Law Journal, 4.4/1980, 383-402, in particular 384: “To whom it 
may be replied that his examples are case law in which the unconscionability doctrine was applied 
to assess the fairness of the economic exchange and level of profits secured by the contract and not, 
as more properly should be, to assess the potential unbalance of the terms and clauses unilaterally 
drafted”) 
(12) R. L. HERSBERGEN, Contracts of Adhesion, cit., 14- 15. 
(13) The roots of the concept lie in Equity: see, among others, G. TREITEL, The Law of 
Contract10, London 1999, 382; H. BEALE (ed.), Chitty On Contracts28, cit., 1, 450; J. D. 
CALAMARI, J. M. PERILLO, The Law of Contracts3, St. Paul 1987, 399.   
(14) J. D. CALAMARI, J. M. PERILLO, The Law of Contracts, cit., 406-407. As it was recently 
expressed in Canadian legal literature, “the idea of sanctity of contract has been balanced 
against the desire of courts to avoid enforcement of contracts that have been perceived as very 
unfair” (S. M. WADDAMS, Abusive or Unconscionable Clauses from a Common Law Perspective, 
in Canadian Business Law Journal, 2010, 49, 378).  
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party is not necessary, except in cases where the effects of the doctrine are 
claimed involving third parties15.  
2.1. USA’s Uniform Commercial Code.  
Under traditional unconscionability doctrine, the remedies available to 
the weaker party are basically the “rescission” of the agreement (in equity)16. 
Thus, the scope of the traditional doctrine is unlikely to prove efficient in 
controlling contract power in adhesion contracts because, as a result of its 
application, the whole contract would be set aside.   
Therefore “it may be asked whether the weaker party, rather than seeking 
rescission of the entire agreement, may seek to set aside the particularly oppressive term 
of the contract and enforce the remaining terms of the unconscionable bargain”17. 
The answer is affirmative in American Common Law, as Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), at § 2-30218 “Unconscionable contract or Clause” 
provides (emphasis added):  
“(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have 
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, 
or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it 
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may 
be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the 
determination”. And, it was noted, “Canada shares with the United States the 
traditions of English common law and equity underlying section 2-302”.19 
 
(15) J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts2, Toronto 2012, 431-436. 
(16) “Agreements can be set aside or enforcement can be refused” (J. D. CALAMARI, J. M. 
PERILLO, The Law of Contracts, cit., 403). In addition, sometimes also damages can be 
awarded (J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 439). 
(17) J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 440 (emphasis added). 
(18) Among USA literature on the Uniform Commercial Code, a classic milestone remains 
R. DUGAN Standardized Forms: Unconscionability and Good Faith, in New England Law 
Review, 1979, 711, which deals with the potential uncertainty arising out of the reference 
made in UCC to unconscionability  -  as «no two courts or commentators employ the same set 
of working rules for determining unconscionability» - and attempts to give different and 
separate scopes to the “unconscionability doctrine” and to the “good faith doctrine”.   
(19) S. M. WADDAMS, Unconscionability in Canadian Contract Law, cit., 541, pointing out that 
the Courts’ control over contract formation is made by excluding unfair provisions or 
modifying them by incorporating implied terms, or by means of the doctrine of 
unconscionability.  
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 The rule can be applied to single standard terms20, if the clauses involved 
are so one–sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the 
time of the making of the contract.21 The provision also shows similarities to 
Unidroit Principles Art. 3.2.7 on gross disparity.22 Moreover, some comparison 
referring to the European Draft Common Frame of Reference has been made by 
the Canadian Scholars23.  
 UCC § 2- 302 is intended to apply directly to “transactions in goods”, but 
it is regarded as an expression of a general principle or is deemed to be 
applicable by analogy: therefore in North American common law it has become a 
part of the general law of contract.24  It has been applied mostly in favor of 
consumers, but the doctrine has been invoked also by professionals and small 
business operators such as franchisees, which can be victimized by 
unconscionable contracts.25 As a result of such widespread application of UCC, 
the adherent party is entitled to seek as a remedy the mere excision of the 
unconscionable clause, maintaining the remainder of the contract intact. 
2.2. The new Canadian doctrine of unconscionability 
Such a broad range of reliefs (namely excision of clauses or adaptation of 
the contract) has not traditionally been granted in Canadian common law, but in 
 
(20) The reference to the contract and to the clause, instead of to the party’s behavior, is 
suggested, moving from section 2-302 UCC, by S. M WADDAMS, Good Faith, 
Unconscionability and Reasonable Expectations, in Journal of Contract Law, 1995, 9, 60, 
footnote 21: “Some modem cases and commentators have used the word 'unconscionable' with 
reference to conduct. The older usage, however, and that of the Uniform Commercial Code (s 2-
302), applies the word unconscionable to the contract itself, or a clause of it, not to the conduct of 
the party seeking enforcement”. 
(21) E. A. FARNSWORTH, Contracts3, New York 1999, 310. 
(22) Unidroit Principles Art. 3.2.7 (“Gross Disparity”) reads: “(1) A party may avoid the 
contract or an individual term of it if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the contract or 
term unjustifiably gave the other party an excessive advantage. Regard is to be had, among other 
factors, to (a) the fact that the other party has taken unfair advantage of the first party's 
dependence, economic distress or urgent needs, or of its improvidence, ignorance, inexperience or 
lack of bargaining skill; and (b) the nature and purpose of the contract. (2) Upon the request of the 
party entitled to avoidance, a court may adapt the contract or term in order to make it accord with 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. (3) A court may also adapt the contract or term 
upon the request of the party receiving notice of avoidance, provided that that party informs the 
other party of its request promptly after receiving such notice and before the other party has 
reasonably acted in reliance on it. The provisions of Art. 3.2.10(2) apply accordingly”. 
(23) S. M. WADDAMS, Abusive or Unconscionable Clauses, cit., 49, 378 ss. (spec. 386) making 
specific reference to sect. 7:207 “Unfair exploitation”. 
(24) E. A. FARNSWORTH, Contracts, cit., 308; J. D. CALAMARI, J. M. PERILLO, The Law of 
Contracts, cit., 403. 
(25) E. A. FARNSWORTH, Contracts, cit., 314; J. D. CALAMARI, J. M. PERILLO, The Law of 
Contracts, cit.,404. 
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the last decades the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the doctrine of 
unconscionability – which rests mainly on the principle of good faith26-  may be 
employed to delete a particular term from the unconscionable bargain: in 
particular to challenge “disclaimer” or “limitation of liability” clauses and to 
render them unenforceable, with the result that the remainder of the agreement 
still remains enforceable27. 
 Canada is a bijuridical federal country of great interest for a civil law 
scholar because it embeds a civil law jurisdiction (Quebec) among a predominant 
number of common law ones and therefore the contacts and coexistence of the 
two legal traditions are intertwined. In addition, certain provincial consumer 
protection legislations (statutes) are, to a large extent, similar to the European 
Union rules. 
In British Columbia, one of the most important common law Provinces, 
Part 2 of the Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, par. 2, 
contains a statutory regime applicable to unconscionable acts or practices by 
suppliers. There, “consumer transactions” are defined as follows: «"consumer 
transaction" means (a) a supply of goods or services or real property by a supplier to a 
consumer for purposes that are primarily personal, family or household, or (b) a 
solicitation, offer, advertisement or promotion by a supplier with respect to a transaction 
referred to in par. (a), and, except in Parts 4 and 5, includes a solicitation of a consumer 
by a supplier for a contribution of money or other property by the “consumer”». 
The statute reverses the burden of proof,
 
requiring the supplier to prove 
that the unconscionable act or practice in question was not committed and it 
empowers the courts with considerable flexibility as to remedies.  
Outside of consumer transactions - i.e., in commercial transactions - the 
control of contract power28 may rely on common law unconscionability doctrine.  
 
(26) See Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, where Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) – dealing 
with the performance of the contract - pointed out that a general principle of good faith 
underlies the law of contracts as it is reflected in many of the existing doctrines, including 
unconscionability. On the the duty of good faith in contract performance, and on its 
extent, see R. JUKIER, Good Faith in Contract: A Judicial Dialogue Between Common Law 
Canada and Québec, in Journal of Commonwealth Law, 2018, 1, 83 ff. (paper presented at the 
Symposium “Bonne foi en matière contractuelle / Good Faith in Contract”, held at the Faculté 
de droit, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec, on May 10–11, 2018). 
(27) J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 440. 
(28) Common law scholars, and Canadians in particular, use the expression “the Control 
of Contract Power” to refer to the concerns arising out of an unshakable faith in the 
“freedom of contract” doctrine and in the related “sanctity of contract”, which both stem 
from the original common law of the 19th century and are based on the idea of contractual 
consent resulting from exchange of offer and acceptance, or from face to face negotiation 
between single individuals (see A. SWAN, J. ADAMSKI, A. Y.  NA, Canadian Contract Law1, 
London 2006, 629 ff.). The expression harks back to the title of the famous essay 
published in the Eighties by another Canadian scholar, Barry J. Reiter (B. J. REITER, The 
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As stated above, in traditional common law unconscionability leads to 
rescission of the contract and therefore the entire contract would be set aside. But 
in the last decades, albeit in principle, the opportunity to challenge single 
particular standard terms (e.g. exculpatory clauses) by means of the 
unconscionability doctrine has been considered in Canadian Supreme Court and 
British Columbia Court of Appeal decisions that have shaped a new “doctrine of 
unconscionable terms”, which effect has been «to preclude reliance on the 
exculpatory clause, but to leave the remainder of the contract intact and enforceable»29. 
As was noted, with such decisions the Supreme Court of Canada has 
«crafted a unique Canadian rule designed to control the unjust application of exculpatory 
clauses», that may call “for a new name” for the doctrine itself30. 
The most important leading cases decided by the Canadian Supreme 
Court were “Hunter” and “Tercon”, in which it was considered feasible and 
practicable to delete an unconscionable exculpatory clause and enforce the 
remainder of the contract31; they have been followed more recently, in 2020, by 
Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller. 
2.2.1. Hunter v. Syncrude. 
In 1989, in the first leading case mentioned above, Hunter v. Syncrude – a 
decision on a dispute which arose out of three contracts for the supply of 
gearboxes for the Alberta tar sands project – the Supreme Court of Canada 
addressed, inter alia, the enforceability of a clause included in standard form 
supply contracts, namely a warranty limiting the liability of the supplier.32  
In the reasoning, it was pointed out: «In light of the unnecessary complexities 
the doctrine of fundamental breach has created, the resulting uncertainty in the law, and 
the unrefined nature of the doctrine as a tool for averting unfairness, I am much inclined 
to lay the doctrine of fundamental breach to rest, and where necessary and appropriate, to 
deal explicitly with unconscionability».33 
 
Control of Contract Power, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1981, 347) in which, with a 
more theoretical approach to the issue, he examined the different legal techniques used 
and useful at macro and micro level for such control, among which “the modern notion 
of unconscionability”.   
(29) J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 822, footnote 21. 
(30) J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 831-832. 
(31) J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 446. 
(32) Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd. [1989] 1 SCR. 426. 
(33) Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd, cit., 462 (Chief Justice, emphasis 
added). S. M. WADDAMS, Unconscionability in Canadian Contract Law, cit., 543 noted that 
Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter of section 2-302 UCC “favored open recognition of a 
general principle of unconscionability. He thought that such a principle was more reliable and 
rational than the tortuous use of judicial techniques, such as construction”, and added “There is 
much in the Canadian experience to bear out Llewellyn's thesis. For example, under the influence 
of the fundamental breach doctrine, the law of disclaimer clauses became arbitrary and 
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In the case, the Court deemed the exclusion clause enforceable because 
the parties to the contract were found to have roughly equal bargaining power 
and so unconscionability doctrine would not be applicable. 34  
Although the decision was positive on the enforceability of the clause at 
issue35, the most important outcome, for the topic here addressed, is that the 
Court (even though in principle) found it possible not to enforce only a single 
clause and maintain the residual part of the contract enforceable. 
2.2.2. Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British Columbia. 
In the 2010 subsequent case Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British 
Columbia36, the Supreme Court was asked to assess the validity of a standard 
term (i.e. exclusion clause), which prevented the Province from being sued for 
damages for having awarded a public work of highway construction to an 
ineligible bidder. 
The Court – with a majority vote of 5 to 4 - found that, because of its 
ambiguity, the exclusion clause could not have prevented the Province from 
being sued for damages and therefore decided in favor of Tercon37. Not holding 
the clause applicable to the case, due to its unclear wording, there was no point – 
for the majority of the Court - in debating whether it can be set aside by the 
unconscionability doctrine.  
The issue was raised, however, in the dissenting opinion written on behalf 
of the four judges (among whom the Chief Justice) McLachlin C.J., Binnie, Abella 
and Rothstein JJ, who deemed that the traditional doctrine of fundamental breach 
was of no avail in that case due to its vagueness38, as was previously noted in 
Hunter v. Syncrude.  
 
unpredictable, and led the courts to wrong results in both directions: courts enforced unfair 
clauses and struck down clauses that were fair and reasonable. The same has happened with the 
law relating to penalty clauses”. 
(34) Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd, cit., 517- 518 
(35) Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd, cit., 522. 
(36) Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British Columbia, 2010 SCC 4, [2010] 1 SCR 69.  
(37) See reasoning of the Court, Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British Columbia, cit., 
par. 79: «If I am wrong about my interpretation of the clause, I would hold, as did the trial judge, 
that its language is at least ambiguous. If, as the Province contends, the phrase “participating in 
this RFP” could reasonably mean “submitting a Proposal”, that phrase could also reasonably 
mean “competing against the other eligible participants”. Any ambiguity in the context of this 
contract requires that the clause be interpreted against the Province and in favor of Tercon under 
the principle contra proferentem: see, e.g., Hillis Oil and Sales Ltd. v. Wynn’s Canada, Ltd., 
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 57, at pp. 68-69. Following this approach, the clause would not apply to bar 
Tercon’s damages claim» (emphasis added).  
(38) Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British Columbia, cit., par. 108. 
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The dissenting minority therefore held it more efficient to rely on the 
unconscionability doctrine39.  
In the very pragmatic way common law courts shape their reasoning, a 
three-step test was laid down to assess whether to enforce an exclusion of 
liability clause included in party’s standard terms: «[122] The first issue, of course, 
is whether as a matter of interpretation the exclusion clause even applies to the 
circumstances established in evidence. This will depend on the court’s assessment of the 
intention of the parties as expressed in the contract. If the exclusion clause does not apply, 
there is obviously no need to proceed further with this analysis. If the exclusion clause 
applies, the second issue is whether the exclusion clause was unconscionable at the time 
the contract was made, “as might arise from situations of unequal bargaining power 
between the parties” (Hunter, at p. 462). This second issue has to do with contract 
formation, not breach. [123] If the exclusion clause is held to be valid and applicable, the 
court may undertake a third enquiry, namely whether the court should nevertheless 
refuse to enforce the valid exclusion clause because of the existence of an overriding public 
policy, proof of which lies on the party seeking to avoid enforcement of the clause, that 
outweighs the very strong public interest in the enforcement of contracts»40. 
In the application to the facts of the case, the dissenting opinion found 
that the exclusion clause drafted as a standard term by the Province of BC was 
not unconscionable and therefore could prevent the Province from being liable 
and bound to pay compensation for having awarded the road construction 
contract to an ineligible bidder.  
Indeed, performing the second step of the proposed test, the dissenting 
opinion noted that although Tercon was not on the same level of power and 
authority as the Province of British Columbia, Tercon was in any case a major 
contractor, perfectly able to look after itself in a commercial context and therefore 
found that there was no relevant imbalance in bargaining power41.  
Having not found such a material imbalance, the clause was deemed 
valid, in the dissenting opinion, and therefore there was room for the third step 
of the test, assessing whether there was an overriding public policy that requires 
refusing to enforce the clause42, which the minority of the court did not find43. 
In their opinion, the dissenting Judges would then have dismissed the 
appeal, which was not the majority decision. But what is relevant, for the topic 
addressed in this paper, is that also this case confirms the developing of the 
unconscionability doctrine resulting from Hunter v. Syncrude, id est the 
applicability of the doctrine not for rescinding a contract as a whole, but to set 
 
(39) Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British Columbia, cit., par. 108. 
(40) Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British Columbia, cit., par. 122 (emphasis added). 
(41) Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British Columbia, cit., par. 131(emphasis added). 
(42) Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British Columbia, cit., par. 135.  
(43) Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. Province of British Columbia, cit., par. 141.  
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aside only the clauses found unconscionable, maintaining and enforcing the 
remainder of the contract as amended without them44.   
Moreover, Tercon can be considered a seminal case because its dissenting 
opinion built up a more precise and clear shape of the Canadian doctrine of 
unconscionability and provided courts and practitioners with the three-step test 
to apply the doctrine itself.  
2.2.3. The “waiver of liability clause” and the “entire agreement clause” 
before the Court of Appeal for British Columbia. 
The provincial courts in British Columbia have applied the 
aforementioned Supreme Court decisions in considering the potential 
unconscionability of specific standard terms. 
In Loycuk v. Cougar Mountain Adventures Ltd. 45, brought before the Court 
of Appeal for British Columbia in 2012, the three-step test suggested in Tercon 
was tried on a “waiver of liability clause” drafted by Cougar Mountain 
Adventures Ltd. (a zip-line tour operator), and signed by the clients, injured 
when they collided while travelling on the same zip-line.  
In the application to the facts, the court did not find it unconscionable for 
the operator of a recreational-sports facility to require a person who wishes to 
engage in activities to sign a release that bars all claims for negligence against the 
operator and its employees, and therefore the standard term was considered 
enforceable.  
A previous case decided by the same Court of Appeal for British 
Columbia in 2007 - Taurus Ventures Ltd. v. Intrawest Corporation and Whistler 
Mountain Resort46 - is also relevant, because it addressed a different clause, the 
“entire agreement clause” (known also as “merger clause” and commonly to be 
found among the so called “boilerplate clauses”).  
The main question posed to the court was «whether pre-contractual 
representations may give rise to damages, where the contract entered into does not 
address the matters about which the representations were made, and includes an "entire 
agreement" clause» (par.1). 
Intrawest sold to Taurus a building lot on Whistler Mountain in a 
development called Kadenwood and marketed it as a "premier ski-in/ski-out" 
residential development, with access to the lots by skiers on ski runs and 
ski trails, but the contract did not provide for the construction of them.  The 
buyer claimed that Intrawest represented that it would build and pay for both 
the ski runs and ski trails within a reasonable period of time following their 
 
(44) See also J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 826 (emphasis added). 
(45) Court of Appeal for British Columbia, Loycuk v. Cougar Mountain Adventures Ltd. 2012 
BCCA 122. 
(46) Court of Appeal for British Columbia, Taurus Ventures Ltd. v. Intrawest Corporation and 
Whistler Mountain Resort Limited Partnership, 2007 BCCA 228. 
 
FRANCESCO DELFINI, Unnegotiated Contracts of Adhesion 
 




purchase of the lot, and that it failed to do so and sued Intrawest for damages for, 
among other claims, breach of a collateral contract and negligent 
misrepresentation. 
The judgement dealt with a specific common law issue, the concurrency 
with action in contract and action in tort (of misrepresentation), when a 
subsequent contract was entered into between the parties. Because the doctrine of 
concurrency between contract and tort actions expressly allows the parties to 
exclude the concurrency itself, when such a clause is inserted in the contract, its 
enforceability could be challenged (inter alia) through the unconscionability 
doctrine, as was done in the reasoning of the previous case “BG Checo”47. 
In the Taurus decision, the court found that the “entire agreement clause” 
could be deemed an exclusion of liability in tort, but did not consider the clause 
unconscionable because it found that «the parties were both sophisticated, 
commercial entities» and «the contract was not a "standard adhesion contract»48. 
The most important Canadian common law literature, having noted that 
such a new Supreme Court of Canada doctrine has been tested mainly with 
regard to limitation or exclusion of liability clauses, wondered «to what types of 
clause is the doctrine likely to apply other than exculpatory clauses», suggesting that 
«the new doctrine is likely to apply to other clauses that have been the subject of “special 
notice” requirements under prior law. Of these provisions, perhaps the most likely 
candidate for subjection to the new doctrine is the “entire agreement clause» and 
recalled also the «arbitration clauses inserted in consumer services agreements for the 
apparent purpose of precluding consumer class actions»49. 
Such a suggestion proved sound and farsighted, as more recently, on June 
26th, 2020, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed an arbitration clause 
embedded in a standard contract drafted by Uber (Uber Technologies Inc. v. 
Heller, 2020 SCC 16) 
2.2.4. Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16 
The facts, as recalled by the Court, were quite simple: “H provides food 
delivery services in Toronto using Uber’s software applications. To become a driver for 
Uber, H had to accept the terms of Uber’s standard form services agreement. Under the 
 
(47) Court of Appeal for British Columbia, Taurus Ventures Ltd. v. Intrawest Corporation and 
Whistler Mountain Resort Limited Partnership, cit., par. 58: «Thus, whether the entire agreement 
clause excludes Intrawest from liability for negligent misrepresentation is not easily answered. 
The principles of concurrency, as expressed in BG Checo, support the entitlement of a plaintiff to 
choose either, or both, contract and tort remedies.  It is also clear, however, that parties may 
arrange their affairs to exclude liability in tort by including valid exclusion clauses in their 
contract». 
(48) Court of Appeal for British Columbia, Taurus Ventures Ltd. v. Intrawest Corporation and 
Whistler Mountain Resort Limited Partnership, cit., par. 59 (although the court left room for 
a more thorough examination of the case in a subsequent full trial). 
(49) J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 443-444. 
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terms of the agreement, H was required to resolve any dispute with Uber through 
mediation and arbitration in the Netherlands. The mediation and arbitration process 
requires up-front administrative and filing fees of US$14,500, plus legal fees and other 
costs of participation. The fees represent most of H’s annual income.  In 2017, H started a 
class proceeding against Uber in Ontario for violations of employment standards 
legislation. Uber brought a motion to stay the class proceeding in favor of arbitration in 
the Netherlands, relying on the arbitration clause in its services agreement with H. H 
argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and therefore invalid. The motion 
judge stayed the proceeding, holding that the arbitration agreement’s validity had to be 
referred to arbitration in the Netherlands, in accordance with the principle that 
arbitrators are competent to determine their own jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal 
allowed H’s appeal and set aside the motion judge’s order. It concluded that H’s 
objections to the arbitration clause did not need to be referred to an arbitrator and could 
be dealt with by a court in Ontario. It also found the arbitration clause to be 
unconscionable, based on the inequality of bargaining power between the parties and the 
improvident cost of arbitration”. 
 The majority of the Court considered the clause unconscionable: “Because 
of the extensive fees for initiating arbitration, there is a real prospect that if the matter is 
sent to be heard by an arbitrator, H’s challenge to the validity of the arbitration 
agreement may never be resolved. The validity of the arbitration agreement must 
therefore be resolved by the court. H’s claim that the arbitration clause is unconscionable 
requires considering two elements: whether there is an inequality of bargaining power 
and whether there is a resulting improvident bargain. There was inequality of bargaining 
power between Uber and H because the arbitration clause was part of an unnegotiated 
standard form contract, there was a significant gulf in sophistication between the parties, 
and a person in H’s position could not be expected to appreciate the financial and legal 
implications of the arbitration clause. The arbitration clause is improvident because the 
arbitration process requires US$ 14,500 in up-front administrative fees. As a result, the 
arbitration clause is unconscionable and therefore invalid”. 
 In the joint reasoning the Court observed: “Unconscionability is an equitable 
doctrine that is used to set aside “unfair agreements [that] resulted from an inequality of 
bargaining power” (John D. McCamus, The Law of Contracts (2nd ed. 2012), at p. 
424). Initially applied to protect young heirs and the “poor and ignorant” from one-sided 
agreements, unconscionability evolved to cover any contract with the combination of 
inequality of bargaining power and improvidence” [par. 54]50  
 
(50) Making reference to M. MCINNES (The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and 
Restitution, New York 2014, 521; see also pp. 520-24; B. E. CRAWFORD, Restitution — 
Unconscionable Transaction — Undue Advantage Taken of Inequality Between Parties, in Can. 
Bar Rev., 1966, 44, 142-143), and adding that: “This development has been described as “one of 
the signal accomplishments of modern contract law, representing a renaissance in the doctrinal 
treatment of contractual fairness” (P. BENSON, Justice in Transactions: A Theory of Contract 
Law, Cambridge 2019, 165; see also A. SWAN, J. ADAMSKI, A. Y. NA, Canadian Contract 
Law4, London 2018, 925)”.  
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 Recalling its precedents Hunter, Norberg and Douez, the Canadian 
Supreme Court stuck to the two layers test which “requires both an inequality of 
bargaining power and a resulting improvident bargain” [par. 65], pointing out that 
“[74] A bargain is improvident if it unduly advantages the stronger party or unduly 
disadvantages the more vulnerable” and that “Improvidence is measured at the time the 
contract is formed”, and, at the same time, limited the assessment for applying the 
doctrine to these two requirements51 . 
 As a consequence, the Court considered that “[84] Unconscionability, 
moreover, can be established without proof that the stronger party knowingly took 
advantage of the weaker. Such a requirement is closely associated with theories of 
unconscionability that focus on wrongdoing by the defendant (see Boustany, at p. 6). But 
unconscionability can be triggered without wrongdoing”, noting that otherwise “[85] 
… A rigid requirement based on the stronger party’s state of mind would also erode the 
modern relevance of the unconscionability doctrine, effectively shielding from its reach 
improvident contracts of adhesion where the parties did not interact or negotiate”.  
 Then, coming to a crucial point, it said: “[89] […] unconscionability has a 
meaningful role to play in examining the conditions behind consent to contracts of 
adhesion, as it does with any contract. The many ways in which standard form contracts 
can impair a party’s ability to protect their interests in the contracting process and make 
them more vulnerable, are well-documented….  The potential for such contracts to create 
an inequality of bargaining power is clear. So too is their potential to enhance the 
advantage of the stronger party at the expense of the more vulnerable one, particularly 
through choice of law, forum selection, and arbitration clauses that violate the adhering 
party’s reasonable expectations by depriving them of remedies. This is precisely the kind 
of situation in which the unconscionability doctrine is meant to apply”.  
 The Court is therefore fully aware that such development of the 
unconscionability doctrine aims to be the main remedy to control the drafting of 
standard contracts and, moreover, of some specific clauses which themselves 
may render the contract of adhesion unfair52. 
 
(51) In particular, repealing the insertion, suggested by the appellant Uber, that 
unconscionability would require, in addition, also the following elements: “a victim’s lack 
of independent legal advice or other suitable advice;  an overwhelming imbalance in bargaining 
power caused by the victim’s ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the language of the 
bargain, blindness, deafness, illness, senility, or similar disability; and the other party’s knowingly 
taking advantage of this vulnerability”: the Court rejected such approach because “[82] 
…This four-part test raises the traditional threshold for unconscionability and unduly narrows the 
doctrine, making it more formalistic and less equity-focused. Unconscionability has always 
targeted unfair bargains resulting from unfair bargaining. Elevating these additional factors to 
rigid requirements distracts from that inquiry”. 
(52) In the words of the Court: “[90] This development of the law of unconscionability in 
connection with standard form contracts is not radical. On the contrary, it is a modern application 
of the doctrine to situations where “the normative rationale for contract enforcement . . . [is] 
stretched beyond the breaking point” (Radin, at p. 179). The link between standard form contracts 
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 Last but not least, it is worth noting that such a new doctrine of 
unconscionability, applied to standard contracts, would lead, as it did in the case 
decided, to the excision of the clause, maintaining the enforceability of the 
remainder of the contract. Therefore, as was stated in the decision, “[87] 
Respecting the doctrine of unconscionability has implications for boiler-plate or standard 
form contracts” 53. 
 The reasoning underlying the decision – introducing a further 
development of the so called new Canadian doctrine of unconscionability - was 
not unanimously viewed with favor.   
Following the concurring reasoning of Judge J. Brown, who supported the 
decision, but not the reasoning, of the majority - suggesting instead that the 
arbitration clause could have been declared invalid and unenforceable simply 
because it “[136] undermines the rule of law and is therefore contrary to public policy” 
– it could be said that the reference to unconscionability added confusion because 
it has stretched its original scope54.  
 
and unconscionability has been suggested in judicial decisions, textbooks, and academic Art.s for 
years (see, e.g., Douez, at para. 114; Davidson v. Three Spruces Realty Ltd. (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 
481 (B.C.S.C.); Hunter, at p. 513; Swan, Adamski and Na, at pp. 992-93; McCamus, at p. 444; 
Jean Braucher, “Unconscionability in the Age of Sophisticated Mass-Market Framing Strategies 
and the Modern Administrative State” (2007), 45 Can. Bus. L.J. 382, at p. 396). It has also been 
present in the American jurisprudence for more than half a century (see Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445 (1965), at pp. 449-50)”.  
(53) The Court added: “As Karl N. Llewellyn, the primary drafter of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, explained: Instead of thinking about “assent” to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that 
so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, 
specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing 
more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or 
indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable 
meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print which has not been read has no business to cut under 
the reasonable meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant and only real 
expression of agreement, but much of it commonly belongs in. There has been an arm’s-length 
deal, with dickered terms. There has been accompanying that basic deal another which . . . at least 
involves a plain expression of confidence, asked and accepted, with a corresponding limit on the 
powers granted: the boiler-plate is assented to en bloc, “unsight, unseen,” on the implicit 
assumption and to the full extent that (1) it does not alter or impair the fair meaning of the 
dickered terms when read alone, and (2) that its terms are neither in the particular nor in the net 
manifestly unreasonable and unfair. (The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960), pp. 
370-71)”. 
(54) See Par 174: “174] In sum, my colleagues’ approach drastically expands the scope of 
unconscionability, provides very little guidance for the doctrine’s application, and does all of this 
in the context of an appeal whose just disposition requires no such change”. On the contrary, it 
should be noted that in the previous SCC decisions (particularly Hunter, reported above) 
the “unconscionability doctrine” was preferred to the old one of “fundamental breach” 
due to its alleged greater precision. 
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That being said, the concurring reasoning is certainly not on the same 
page as the previous decision of the Canadian Supreme Court, when it suggests 
that the doctrine could not apply to single clauses55 and when it refers the 
doctrine merely to procedural rather than substantial unfairness56; in any case the 
uncomplete development, in common law, of the doctrine of severance has been 
signaled by the most prominent Canadian scholars57 for some time. 
3. Unconscionability doctrine and Civil Code of Louisiana. 
In a well-known research project carried out in the 1980s in Louisiana - 
one of the two instances of Civil law among the North American common law 
jurisdictions of Canada and USA -  noting that Louisiana was one (the other 
being California) of the two US states which did not enact section 2-302 of the 
UCC (referring to unconscionability), R. Hersbergen58, after having examined 
several cases decided by Louisiana courts on contracts and clauses that elsewhere 
in the US could have been decided in accordance with § 2-302 UCC, concluded 
that “in the clear majority of these "unconscionability cases," the result yielded by 
application of § 2-302 or of its principle would be, and would have been, the same if 
decided under the Civil Code of Louisiana”.  
The underlying rationale of the research was the prospected functional 
equivalence of an express codification and recognition of the unconscionability (§ 
2-302 UCC) and of the original rules on interpretation, contained in the Louisiana 
Civil Code (LCC), for the substantial59 control of adhesion contracts, as they 
 
(55) “[172] …the doctrine of unconscionability was never meant to apply to individual provisions 
of a contract. Unlike public policy considerations that target a specific contractual provision, 
unconscionability’s substantive inquiry must consider the entire bargain — that is, the entire 
exchange of value between the parties”.  
(56) Par. 160 
(57) See J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 445- 446, who noted that no role for a 
severance doctrine has been suggested by the courts in this context. 
(58) R. L. HERSBERGEN, Unconscionability: The Approach of the Louisiana Civil Code, in 
Louisiana Law Review, 1983, 43. 1318-1319. The main features of the case law examined 
were described by the author as follows: “Not all of the unconscionability cases contain a clear 
holding that the contract or a clause therein is unconscionable; in several cases, unconscionability 
is offered as an alternative ground for non-enforcement. In virtually all the cases, however, a 
standard form contract, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, is expressly or implicitly involved. 
None of the cases give a clear indication that any serious bargaining as to terms took place.” 
(59) The unconscionability doctrine received in § 2-302 UCC is mostly relevant on the 
substantial side: “Judges and legal commentators frequently speak of "procedural" 
unconscionability as distinguished from "substantive" unconscionability. (…) Substantive 
unconscionability has reference to the terms themselves and whether they are commercially 
reasonable. In applying UCC section 2-302, judges tend to examine first the terms of the contract 
alleged to be unconscionable, and if they are not unreasonably favorable to one party, the inquiry 
into unconscionability typically ends” (R. L. HERSBERGEN, Unconscionability, cit., 1401).  
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allow courts “to refuse to enforce any clause or group of clauses found to be 
unconscionable or, indeed, to refuse to enforce the contract as a whole”.60   
 The Louisiana Civil Code (unlike the Quebec Civil Code) follows mostly 
the original path of the Napoleonic Code, and does not have any special 
provision for standard form contracts, except for some rules on interpretation 
that can be exploited by courts to provide relief for the adherent party to a 
contract which clauses have been unilaterally drafted ambiguously, or which 
would lead to “absurd” consequences. 
On one hand the reference is to the current Art. 2056 LCC “Standard-form 
contracts”: “In case of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved, a provision in a contract 
must be interpreted against the party who furnished its text. A contract executed in a 
standard form of one party must be interpreted, in case of doubt, in favor of the other 
party”, which contains a rule leading to results similar to the common law’s 
“contra proferentem” doctrine (as we noted above) and also to Art. 2474 LCC 
“Construction of ambiguities respecting obligations of seller”: The seller must 
clearly express the extent of his obligations arising from the contract, and any obscurity 
or ambiguity in that expression must be interpreted against the seller”, containing a 
rule for sale which courts have applied, by analogy, to contractors, lessors and 
other suppliers61.  
On the other hand, Louisiana courts have found grounds in the 
interpretation rules to avert the enforcing of contracts which effects appeared 
absurd. As was noted, regarding case law on “Clauses or Contracts that Lead to an 
Absurdity”, “Under Art. 194562, the courts are bound to give legal effect to a contract 
according to "the true intent" of the parties, determined by the words of the contract, 
"when these are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences"63. 
4. American Civil Codes and control of the merits of the unnegotiated 
terms: Quebec and Argentina cases. 
The legal framework differs from Louisiana in other civil law American 
jurisdictions, based on more recent codes. Reference could be made, in North 
America, to Quebec and, in South America, to Argentina.  
4.1. The Quebec Civil Code 
The Quebec Civil Code (QCC) considers and defines the result of 
standardized contracting64 in art. 1379: “A contract of adhesion is a contract in which 
 
(60) R. L. HERSBERGEN, Unconscionability, cit., 1315-1316. 
(61)  R. L. HERSBERGEN, Unconscionability, cit., 1318, 1346. 
(62) The current art. 2045 LCC, which reads: “Art. 2045.  Determination of the intent of the 
parties. Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties.” 
(63) R. L. HERSBERGEN, Unconscionability, cit., 1394. 
(64) For the expression, R. L. HERSBERGEN, Unconscionability, cit., 1317. 
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the essential stipulations were imposed or drawn up by one of the parties, on his behalf or 
upon his instructions, and were not negotiable”.65 
Having defined the category, the Code addresses the control of the 
drafter’s power in art. 1437, which reads: “An abusive clause in a consumer contract 
or contract of adhesion is null, or the obligation arising from it may be reduced. 
An abusive clause is a clause which is excessively and unreasonably detrimental 
to the consumer or the adhering party and is therefore not in good faith; in particular, a 
clause which so departs from the fundamental obligations arising from the rules 
normally governing the contract that it changes the nature of the contract is an abusive 
clause”. 
The rule is relevant, for our topic, from several perspectives. 
Firstly, its scope encompasses both consumer contracts and contracts of 
adhesion, making clear that a control of contract power is needed not only in the 
B2C sector, but also when an individual negotiation cannot occur although 
between professionals, one of which imposes or drafts standard terms. 
Secondly, it refers to specific clauses instead of to the whole contract, 
making it easier to maintain the remainder of the contract  intact without the 
abusive clause. 
Thirdly, the assessment demanded of the Judge is substantial and not 
limited to formal requirements. Moreover, the benchmark indicated is the good 
faith principle. 
Lastly, but no less importantly, it gives clear guidance to the Judge, 
considering abusive a clause which “so departs from the fundamental obligations 
arising from the rules normally governing the contract that it changes the nature of the 
contract”. Such a long string of words could be summarized as what civil law 
scholars refer to as the “default rules”, describing the subject matter, the very 
core and the object of the contract; in other words, the “supplementary” (also 
called non-mandatory) rules that civil law codes provide as a fair and balanced 
set of rights and obligations of the parties to that particular type of contract: such 
is the most widely accepted interpretation of Canadian civil law scholars of 
Quebec.66     
 
(65) Art. 1379, 2nd par., names the negotiated contract as “contract by mutual agreement” and 
the category is defined as the remnant kind of contract, stating: “Any contract that is not a 
contract of adhesion is a contract by mutual agreement”. 
(66) S. GHOZLAN, La notion d’obligation essentielle dans le cadre du contrôle des clauses abusives : 
Étude des systèmes juridiques français et québécois, in http://editionthemis.com, 2015, 414 : 
« …les obligations essentielles comme celles qui découlent de la nature du contrat, celles sans 
lesquelles le contrat ne peut subsister, qui s’imposent aux parties contractantes de par la nécessité 
de respecter l’essence même du contrat. En dépit du fait qu’elles s’imposent aux parties, il ne peut 
s’agir de règles impératives puisque celles-ci ne gouvernent pas « habituellement » le contrat, mais 
toujours. Par déduction, il est donc question de dispositions supplétives, du moins pour les 
contrats nommés. En effet, une clause dérogeant à une règle impérative est nécessairement nulle 
sans qu’il faille recourir à l’Art. 1437 du Code civil du Québec ». 
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4.2. The Argentinian Civil and Commercial Code 
It is worth noting that the same approach is to be found in an important 
South American Civil Law Jurisdiction, Argentina. 
On 1 August 2015, a new Civil and Commercial Code was enacted in 
Argentina by Law no. 26994 (Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación, or CCCN), 
repealing the former separate Civil and Commercial Codes and following, on the 
unification of the two into one, the Italian path set in 1942.  
As an XXI century Code, the CCCN provides a complete set of rules (Art.s 
984 to 989 CCCN) for adhesion contracts or standard-form contracts: contracts 
entered into by adhering to predisposed general clauses as defined in Art. 98467.  
For such contracts, stringent provisions will apply to the standard terms, 
requiring complete and plain wording of the clauses and deeming as unwritten 
standard terms distorting obligations of the adhering party or extending the 
rights of the drafter of the clause.  
In particular, Art. 988 CCCN, headed “Abusive clauses”, reads: “In the 
contracts envisaged in this section, the following must be considered as non-written: a) 
the clauses that denaturalize the obligations of the predisposing party; b) those that 
import waiver or restriction to the rights of the adherent, or extend predisposing’s rights 
that result from supplementary norms; c) those which, due to their content, writing or 
presentation, are not reasonably foreseeable”68. 
Furthermore, the rules, as they are set out in the civil and commercial 
code, apply not only in consumer transactions, but also in commercial ones. 
Lastly, as it was in Quebec Civil Code, there is an even more direct 
reference to “default rules” – “las normas supletorias” – i.e., the “supplementary” 
(also called non-mandatory) rules provided by civil law codes as a fair and 
balanced set of rights and obligations of the parties.  
 
On the same position, S. GRAMMOND, La règle sur les clauses abusives sous l’éclairage du droit 
comparé, in Les Cahiers de droit, 2010. 51, 104- 105: «Le texte même de l’Art. 1437 suggère au 
juriste de mesurer l’écart entre la clause dont est évalué le caractère abusif et les «obligations 
essentielles qui découlent des règles gouvernant habituellement le contrat. (…) Le caractère 
habituel d’une règle peut d’abord être évalué sur le plan juridique : le tribunal se réfère alors aux 
dispositions supplétives des chapitres du Code civil sur les contrats nommés, qui s’appliquent à un 
contrat, à moins que les parties n’en aient disposé autrement ».  
(67) (Emphasis added). The Spanish wording is: Articulo 984.- “Definición”: “El contrato 
por adhesión es aquel mediante el cual uno de los contratantes adhiere a cláusulas generales 
predispuestas unilateralmente, por la otra parte o por un tercero, sin que el adherente haya 
participado en su redacción”.  
(68) The Spanish wording is: Articulo 988.- “Cláusulas abusivas”: “En los contratos previstos 
en esta sección, se deben tener por no escritas: a) las cláusulas que desnaturalizan las obliga- 
ciones del predisponente; b) las que importan renuncia o restricción a los derechos del adherente, o 
amplían derechos del predisponente que resultan de normas supletorias; c) las que por su 
contenido, redacción o presentación, no son razonablemente previsibles”. 
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5. Unnegotiated standard clauses affecting the core and subject matter 
of the contract. 
The references made by the Quebec Civil Code (art. 1437) to “a clause 
which so departs from the fundamental obligations arising from the rules normally 
governing the contract that it changes the nature of the contract”, and by the 
Argentinian Civil and Commercial Code (art. 988) to clauses ”that denaturalize the 
obligations of the predisposing party” or “import waiver or restriction to the rights of the 
adherent, or extend predisposing’s rights that result from supplementary norms”, recall 
examples that have shown up for decades in civil law jurisdictions, whenever the 
unnegotiated standard clauses affect the very core of the contract and its subject 
matter. 
The issue is not limited to contractual relations among large companies 
and small or medium-sized ones, as three categories of legal cases in Italy have 
proven in the past decades. 
6. Some relevant Italian Case Law 
6.1. The Safe Deposit Boxes Cases 
The first group of cases relates to the safe deposit boxes arranged by 
banks.  
When a series of floods occurred (mainly November 1st, 1966 in Florence) 
and the contents of the boxes were damaged or destroyed by the water, clients 
sued the banks for full compensation for the damage that occurred, but the banks 
opposed these claims relying on standard terms (Art. 2 and 3 of the Banking 
standard terms crafted by ABI, the national association of banks) that limited 
damages to 1,000,000 old Lira (equivalent to about Euro 500 today), a merely 
symbolic and nominal value compared to the value of goods which are usually 
placed in safe boxes.  
Pursuant to Art. 1229, headed “Exoneration of liability clauses”, 1st par., 
Italian Civil Code (ICC)69, “Any agreement which, in advance, excludes or limits the 
liability of the debtor for fraud, malice or gross negligence is void” and therefore 
plaintiff usually claimed bank’s gross negligence to render these standard terms 
unenforceable, but the defendant rebutted, to challenge the applicability of Art. 
1229, that such a standard clause was not an exculpatory one, but a clause which 
merely determines the  subject matter of the contract (an issue allegedly being 
entirely left to the freedom of the parties).  
It is worth noting that in these cases Art. 1839 ICC states that “In providing 
safe deposit boxes, the bank is answerable to the user for the fitness and custody of the 
premises and for the safekeeping of the box, except for fortuitous events” and, as a result 
of such a standard term, the bank in practice sets aside what is provided in Art. 
 
69 The translation of ICC quoted in this paper is the one provided by J. H. MERRYMAN, The 
Italian Civil Code, Dobbs Ferry 1969. 
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1839 itself (although the code is silent on whether such a rule is mandatory or 
not). 
In those cases, the Italian Supreme Court ruled70 the clauses ineffective as 
they result in exculpatory clauses even if they are reshaped, as they were, 
nominally asserting that the client was bound not to insert in the safe boxes 
goods of a value exceeding 1,000,000 old Lira. In that case, according to Italian 
scholars71, although formally shaping the contract’s subject matter, the clause 
deprived the contract itself of its very cause as depicted in the reported Art. 1839 
ICC. 
6.2. Suretyships in Favor of Banks Cases. 
Another group of Italian cases relates to suretyships in favor of banks.  
According to Art. 1936, 1st par., ICC: “A surety is a person who guarantees the 
performance of the obligation of another by binding himself personally to the creditor”. 
Under Italian law, the guarantee is given upon condition of the validity of 
the guaranteed obligation, as Art. 1939 ICC states: “A suretyship is not valid unless 
the primary obligation is valid…”. 
When the creditor is a bank, the contract is entered into by adhesion of the 
surety to standard terms crafted by ABI (the national banks’ association) and 
these standard terms set aside Art. 1939, 1941 and 1957 ICC which, although not 
explicitly characterized as mandatory, depict the subject matter of the suretyship 
contract in a manner that is completely overturned by such standard terms72.   
 
(70) The Italian Supreme Court’s most important decisions on safe deposit box contracts 
were: Cass. 29th March 1976, no. 1129, in Banca, borsa e tit. cred., 1976, II, 173 ff.; Cass. (joint 
divisions) 1st July 1994, no. 6225 and 6226, in Giur. It., 1995, I, 1994 and, more recently, 
Cass.  30th September 2009 no. 20948. For a reference to the topic, in the Italian legal 
literature in English, see M. GRAZIADEI, Control of price, cit., 204. 
(71) See F. BENATTI, Le clausole di esonero da responsabilità nella prassi bancaria, in ID. Studi 
Urbinati, 1976, 140; C. CASTRONOVO, La responsabilità da cassette di sicurezza, in AA. VV., Le 
operazioni bancarie, edited by G. B. Portale, Milano 1978, 493. 
(72) Art. 1939 and 1941 ICC show the close link between primary obligation and 
suretyship, as they respectively state, regarding to its validity: «Validity of suretyship. A 
suretyship is not valid unless the primary obligation is valid, except when the suretyship is 
undertaken for an obligation contracted by a person lacking capacity» (Art. 1939), and 
«Limitations of Surety. A suretyship cannot be undertaken for a greater amount than that owed 
by the primary debtor nor under more burdensome conditions» (Art. 1941, 1st par.). Subsequent 
Art. 1957, 1st par., adds: «Maturity of primary obligation. The liability of a surety remains in 
effects even after the primary obligation has matured, provided that the creditor, within six 
months, has instituted an action against the debtor and has diligently pursued it». It must also 
be considered that under Italian Law the suretyships is a contract that heavily affects the 
guarantor, as his payment can be relieved only by action of recourse against the debtor’s 
assets, and is a contract that needs no consideration; being a “typical” promise, it is 
binding as such and, as was noted by G. Gorla, one of the pioneers in Italian comparative 
law studies, «because of the serious consequence of the suretyship, the civil law codes require an 
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In recent decisions73, the Italian Supreme Court ruled that such standard 
terms, being the outcome of an anti-competition cartel (the national banks’ 
association ABI, as so deemed by the Court), are barred by Art. 2 of the Italian 
Competition Law (Law no. 287/1990) and therefore are null and void. 
6.3. The Claims-Made Insurance Policies Cases.   
The third group of cases comes from a more global contractual 
phenomenon, the shifting of civil liability insurance contracts from the loss 
occurrence model to the claims-made one. 
Art. 1917, 1st par., ICC reads: “In liability insurance the insurer is bound to 
indemnify the insured for the damages which the latter must pay to a third person 
because of events occurring during the insurance period and resulting in the liability 
referred to in the insured contract. Damages deriving from fraudulent acts are excluded”. 
The choice of the Italian Civil Code, in shaping (professional) liability 
insurance, was in the direction of the loss occurrence model, in which the trigger 
for coverage is an accident or an unfavorable event causing damage or loss due 
to malpractice committed during the validity of the policy.  
A completely different model of liability policy – the claims-made 
insurance – appeared on the market mainly in the 1980s and was created in 
common law systems74 to enable the insurance industry to cope with long tails 
 
express manifestation of the intent to guarantee another’s debt: see Art. 2015 French Civil Code, 
1937 Italian Civil Code, Art. 1766 German Civil Code, … require the written form …”: such a 
contract implies for the surety “a risk corresponding to the possibility of the principal debtor 
becoming insolvent. This risk may represent a detriment more serious that that suffered in making 
a donation» (G. GORLA, Suretyship (fideiussio) promises to pay another’s debt: promises to give 
security, in ID., The fundamental problems of contracts. Principles, methods, and techniques of the 
civil law as compared with the common law, notes by Gino Gorla, course held in 1958-1959 at 
University of Michigan Law School, now published in ID., I problemi fondamentali del 
contratto, Napoli 2017, 227, footnote 3).  
(73) Cass., 12th December 2017, no. 29810; Cass., 22nd May 2019, no. 13846. 
(74) The claims-made policy can be characterized as an “alien contract” (quoting G. DE 
NOVA, The Alien Contract, in Riv. dir. priv., 2011, 487 ff.: «A contract governed by Italian law 
but conceived and drafted on the basis of a common law model and in particular a U.S. and/or a 
U.K. model can be depicted as an “alien contract”)», having been imported in Italy from a 
common law tradition. Therefore it could be of some interest to verify whether the 
domestic debate has taken into due account the suggestion and indications given by the 
legal system of origin.   Common law Courts are fully aware of the consequent risk of 
coverage gaps, the same mentioned by the Italian Supreme Court as a potential hazard for an 
insured’s clients.  Sometimes, by means of an appropriate construction of the contract, 
Courts may avoid the insured being unreasonably denied of policy coverage, as was 
suggested by the Court of Appeal for Ontario, in Stuart v. Hutchins, (1998): «…where 
circumstances beyond the control of the insured render it physically impossible for the insured to 
comply with the notice provision, general principles of contract interpretation would come to the 
insured's aid (…) it would be open to the court to construe the notice provision as containing an 
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implied term that non-compliance due to physical impossibility would not be fatal to coverage but 
that the insured be given a reasonable opportunity to comply». 
Moreover, it must be pointed out that policies sold in the Italian market usually contain a 
definition of “claim” – which is necessary, as a statutory provision in ICC describing claims-
made insurance is absent – with a very narrow scope, which prevents the insured from 
reporting circumstances or mere potential claims that may likely result in a future real claim.  
This situation was addressed in an English leading case, Kidsons (a Firm) v. Lloyds 
Underwriters, brought before the England and Wales High Court Queen's Bench 
Division - Commercial Court, and decided on 9thAugust 2007 (read it at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2007/1951.html ), where it was found that: «It is 
integral to the structure of claims made policies being successively renewed from year to year, that 
provision is made for claims arising after the expiry of any one policy period out of circumstances 
of which the assured has first become aware during that period. Unless provision is made to treat 
such claims as having been made during that policy period, the concept of claims-made policies 
applying in successive policy years would create an unexpected and inappropriate gap in 
coverage».  
The relevant point, for the Italian domestic market where this common law contractual 
model has landed, is that the High Court found the inclusion of a deeming clause 
“integral” to the structure of claims-made policies being successively renewed from year 
to year.  
In other words, a deeming clause is – and must be – part of the naturalia negotii of an 
insurance coverage split, as is usually arranged by insurers, in short periods of one year 
each, much shorter compared to the years of practice of the professionals and to the 
longer statute of limitation period for professional liability.  
In conclusion, the British common law system gives a clear indication in construing 
claims-made policies combined with the faculty to gain coverage by reporting, “as soon 
as practicable”, circumstances of which the insured has become aware during the 
insurance period, and which may give rise to a loss or a claim against them likely after 
the completion of the same period. 
Such a clear indication is not present in the Canadian common law system. 
In the leading case Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada v. Guardian Insurance Company of 
Canada and ING Insurance Company of Canada (Jesuit v. Guardian) decided on 10 
January 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada was fully aware of the possible lack of 
coverage in claims-made policies, but it noted that policies offering more comprehensive 
protection are available on the Canadian market: among them, on the one side, claims-
made policies enlarged with a deeming clause and, on the other side, occurrence based 
policies.  
The Court therefore refused to hold the insurer liable for claims not reported during the 
coverage period mainly due to the availability on the market of these more 
comprehensive policies and to the failure of the insured Jesuit Fathers to purchase them. 
In other words, as the policy did not include a “deeming clause” (also known as “notice 
of circumstance clause”) in spite of the fact that it was commercially available upon the 
last renewal, the Canadian Supreme Court inferred that the Jesuits did not want this 
coverage to be included in the policy: hence, as a consequence, the client’s refusal to 
purchase the additional coverage offered by the deeming clause was considered an 
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damages (i.e. product liability, asbestos exposure, etc.), that arise a long time after 
their cause and may even result from an uncertain series of different co-causes.    
The claims-made policy has a completely different trigger than an 
occurrence-based policy: i.e., the filing and initial reporting of a claim during the 
policy period, so the professional malpractice need not have occurred during the 
policy period, for coverage. 
In short, claims-made means, for the insurance industry, avoidance of 
“long tail”: which is why in the Italian market it is nowadays quite impossible to 
find any offer of an occurrence based professional liability policy.   
As has been pointed out also by the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di 
Cassazione)75, there may be relevant negative issues for the insured on a claims-
made basis in respect of the loss occurrence model shaped by Art. 1917 ICC: 
firstly, claims-made policyholders may find it impossible to change insurance 
company once an actual claim has brought their potential risk to the attention of 
insurance underwriters; secondly, if the misconduct that originates the 
professional liability occurs during the policy period but the claim is not raised in 
the same period, they may find it difficult to obtain a new claims-made policy 
when they have complied with the duty to disclose circumstances that may result 
in a prospective (although not yet made) claim; thirdly, professionals need to 
maintain insurance for new claims from year to year and need to be able to 
obtain cover for potential claims, not yet made, of which they learn in the current 
year. 
 As quoted above, Art. 1917, 1st par., ICC describes liability insurance as a 
contract on a loss occurrence basis and there is no provision in ICC that refers to 
the claims-made policy. In any case, Art. 1917, 1st par., is not characterized as 
mandatory under Art. 1932, 1st par., ICC. 
 
implied rejection of this coverage that prevented the insurance company from being held 
liable to indemnify the client. 
The Italian insurance policy market being so different, where professionals currently 
cannot find an occurrence-based policy and can hardly find a claims-made with deeming 
clause policy (and, if any, at a prohibitive price), the reasoning of Jesuit v. Guardian is of 
little help in dealing with the issues raised in Italy. 
An important suggestion, on the point, came, instead, from Australia, where in FAI v. 
Australian Hospital Care Pty Limited (FAI v. Australian) - a case decided on 9th July 1999 
by the Supreme Court of Queensland and subsequently, on 27th June 2001 by the High 
Court of Australia – the Courts considered the “deeming” clause a necessary complement 
to fix the inadequate cover given by the mere “claims made and reported” clause: among 
the Reasons for Judgment – written by Judge Derrington – it is worth noting that the 
premium was considered comprehensive for the coverage of a whole, composed by the 
“simple claims-made clause” plus the “deeming clause”, the combined operation of them 
being necessary to avoid gaps of coverage.  
(75) The concern for potential “coverage gaps” is also expressed in Cass. (joint divisions), 
6th May 2016, no. 9140, quoted below. 
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We must add that, as stated by Art. 1322 ICC, headed Contractual 
Autonomy76: “1. The parties can freely determine the contents of the contract within the 
limit imposed by law. 2. The parties can also make contracts that are not of the types that 
are particularly regulated, provided that they are directed to the realization of interest 
worthy of protection according to legal order”.  
Thus, the main questions are: can the parties modify and reverse the 
scope of liability insurance set forth by Art. 1917, 1st par. ICC?  To what extent can 
the insurer – especially drafting standard terms - reshape the scope of the 
professional liability policy? Can the insurer do so also if it leads to gaps in 
coverage that may affect not only the professional insured, but even his/her 
clients whom the coverage, in the end, is intended by law to benefit?  
These questions have been dealt with by the Italian Supreme Court in the 
decisions rendered on the topic. In examining them, we must be aware that 
judgements of the Italian Supreme Court on claims-made policies have been 
sometimes inaccurately reported to be entirely in favor of the feasibility and 
unquestionability of the model as per Italian law. On the contrary, on non-biased 
and closer examination, the decisions appear more dubious.  
It is true that Italian Supreme Court judgment no. 5624, of 15th March 
2005, stated that claims-made polices may be valid under Art. 1322, second par., 
ICC, but the reasoning aimed to affirm that these clauses fell under the definition 
of “unfair terms” of the Art. 1341 of the Civil Code on standard terms and 
conditions of contracts, and required specific approval in writing by the insured, 
the clause being void and unenforceable without it. 
Again, a subsequent decision, no. 3622, lodged on 17th February 2014, was 
not a point in favor of the claims made. In that case, it was the insurer that 
alleged the claims-made clause (by itself crafted and imposed) was void, in order 
to deny cover for claims made during the policy period but relating to 
professional mistakes that occurred before the contract was entered into. The 
decision, therefore, can be regarded mostly as a ban on attempted unfair 
withdrawal from the contract, more than as an assertion of indisputable validity 
of the claims-made model. 
Then came the Joint Divisions of the Italian Supreme Court, with decision 
no. 9140 filed on 6th May 2016,  in which the Court stated that the so called 
“mixed” claims-made policies (those providing coverage only if: i) the claim is 
made during the policy period and ii) also the event – i.e. the misconduct of the 
professional - occurred within a limited previous period) may be declared 
void because the underlying interests sought by the contract do not deserve 
protection under the applicable law, sending them for such case by case 
assessment, under Art. 1322, second par., to lower courts (Tribunals and Courts 
of Appeal).  The decision did not offer any guideline for such evaluation, except 
 
76 On the topic, briefly, G. ALPA, V. ZENO ZENCOVICH, Italian Private Law, London 2007, 
157 ff.; G. IUDICA, P. ZATTI, Linguaggio e regole del diritto privato, Padova 2005, 115. 
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for the note that the suitability of the policy is not likely to be found where the 
claims-made clause, regardless of how it is conceived, exposes the insured to 
“coverage gaps”. Moreover, the Supreme Court decision stated that if the clause 
were found null and void, the statutory provision of Art. 1917, first par., ICC 
would apply to the contract, which therefore would remain valid but would be 
construed as a loss occurrence policy. 
Subsequently, the Third Division of the Supreme Court, by decision no. 
10506 rendered on 28th April 2017, nominally following the previous decision of 
the Joint Divisions, stated that a claims-made clause that fails to allow the 
insured to obtain coverage for malpractice (in that case medical) occurring in the 
policy period but not resulting in a proper claim being made in the same period 
is not directed at interests worthy of protection and therefore the policy remains 
enforceable, except for the claims-made clause, as a loss occurrence insurance 
pursuant to Art. 1917 first par.  
At present, the debate on the claims-made policy is not yet over in Italy.  
On 24th September 2018 a second judgement, no. 22437, of the Supreme 
Court Joint Divisions was lodged, stating the following principle of law: the 
model of insurance for civil liability with clauses “on claims-made bases” is a sub 
type of insurance against damages claims, as an exemption permitted in the first 
par. of Art. 1917 of the Civil Code, and remains a typical contract. It follows that, 
with respect to the single insurance contract, it is unnecessary to ascertain the 
worth of the contract itself under the second par. of Art. 1322 above quoted, but 
the lower courts must consider whether it remained “within the limits imposed 
by law”, as stated by the first par. of the same art. 1322: therefore the insured 
party can seek remedies that range from pre-contractual liability for unfair terms, 
to nullity, full or partial, of the contract due to lack of specific cause, with 
potential judicial adaptation of the contract according to the principle of 
adequacy of the insurance for the practical purpose pursued by the contracting 
parties. 
More recently, a decision rendered on 13th May 2020 (no. 8894) by the 
Third Division of the Supreme Court considered null and void a claims-made 
clause as it required, for the coverage, the claim made by the damaged party to 
be filed within 12 months from the expiration of the insurance. The Court held 
that such a clause departs from the contractual type depicted by art. 1917 ICC 
and is unlawful as it is contrary to art. 2965 ICC77, which forbids stipulations 
establishing forfeitures that jeopardize the exercise of the counterparty’s rights. 
Had the Italian Civil Code had a rule similar to art. 1437 Quebec Civil 
Code or art. 988 Argentinian Civil and Commercial Code, the decisions in the 
cases reported above would have benefited of a more direct and clear ground to 
 
(77) Art. 2965 reads: “Forfeiture established by contract. Stipulations establishing forfeiture 
upon the expiration of time limits which make the exercise of rights excessively difficult for one of 
the parties are void”. 
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prevent what has been called “denaturalization of the obligations of the 
predisposing party”. 
 The reason for such a gap in ICC is likely to be merely historical.  
 The code was conceived in the early 1940s and had its roots in the 
previous 19th century Civil Code of 1865: as a result, the matter of adhesion 
contracts was poorly addressed, if we consider it nowadays.  
 Such a remark is not only confirmed by the cases of American Codes (of 
Canadian Quebec and Argentina) referred to above, but also by the recent 
amendments to the French Civil Code, from which, in origin, practically all civil 
codes stemmed. 
7. The French Civil Code, as amended in 2015. 
The French Civil Code was amended by a process started in 2015 (Law 
2015-177 of 16 February 201578), passed through Ordinance 2016-13179 and 
concluded in 2018 (Law 2018-287). 
What here matters most is the new Art. 1171, included in the subsection 
headed “The Content of a Contract”, that reads: “Art. 1171. – Any term of a 
standard form contract which creates a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations 
of the parties to the contract is deemed not written”80. 
Firstly, it must be pointed out that in the French Civil Code, as in the 
Italian Consumer Code, the assessment of the potential significant imbalance 
must not concern either the main subject-matter to be performed under the 
contract or the adequacy of the price in relation to the act of performance. 
Then it is worth noting that the applicability of the rule expressly to 
“adhesion contracts” was added at the end of the legislative amendment process, 
to link the scope of the rule only to cases where the “significant imbalance” 
occurred without the opportunity to negotiate the contract. 
Therefore, the new wording of Art. 1171 makes a significant distinction 
between adhesion and negotiated contracts (as art. 1379 Quebec Civil Code had 
previously done), giving courts, in the first category of cases, power to adapt the 
contract itself, removing the unbalancing standard terms from it and maintaining 
the remainder of the content. 
Again, the insertion, in the same section, of Art. 1170 - that states: “Any 
contract term which deprives a debtor’s essential obligation of its substance is deemed not 
 
(78) “LOI n° 2015-177 du 16 février 2015 relative à la modernisation et à la simplification du droit 
et des procédures dans les domaines de la justice et des affaires intérieures” (art.s 8 et 27). 
(79) “Ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime 
général et de la preuve des obligations”. 
(80) French Civil Code 2016 translated by John Cartwright (University of Oxford), 
Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson (Professeur à l’Université Panthéon-Assas) and Simon 
Whittaker (University of Oxford) (French original wording: “Dans un contrat d'adhésion, 
toute clause non négociable, déterminée à l'avance par l'une des parties, qui crée un déséquilibre 
significatif entre les droits et obligations des parties au contrat est réputée non écrite”). 
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written”81 - is of utmost relevance: the scope of the rule, which is not limited to 
adhesion contracts, avoids the very subject of a contract being shaped in a 
manner that could render the contract itself useless (as could be, in some cases, 
claims-made professional insurance policies, as long as they imply coverage gaps 
to the detriment of both the professional insured and his/her client). 
 
8. Conclusions 
At the one hand, looking to the Civil Law Jurisdictions, we can note that 
codifications of Quebec, Argentina and France, being more recent, could give 
guidance also with reference to the Italian Civil Code, previously conceived and 
enacted, and could allow courts of civil law - whenever a contract of  a type 
particularly regulated is unilaterally crafted in a fashion that changes the nature of 
it or “denaturalizes the obligations of the predisposing party” and outside “the 
fundamental obligations arising from the rules normally governing the contract” (to use 
the Argentinian and Canadian wording) - to re-establish  the supplementary 
norms,  which can be overridden only in individual negotiations between the 
parties.  
Indeed, in the unnegotiated contracts of adherence these rules must be 
considered mandatory and could not be unilaterally overturned: at least when 
they shape the very scope and the juridical content of the agreement, as they 
must be considered as the “limits imposed by law” referred to by art. 1322 first 
paragraph (recently pointed to as a benchmark by the Italian Supreme Court to 
assess the validity of claims made insurance policies).  
Considering, on the other hand, the Common Law jurisdictions, we can 
acknowledge that the unconscionability doctrine can allow a quite efficient 
control on the contract power, especially on standard terms, whenever no statute 
provides express benchmarks for assessing the fairness of the agreement.  
However, certain issues remain unsolved: firstly, the range of standard 
terms or clauses that fall within the doctrine’s scope and, secondly, how to 
manage the adaptation of the contract, unburdened by the unconscionable 
clauses. 
Canadian legal literature appears fully aware of this. 
Concerning the first issue, the Supreme Court of Canada new doctrine82 
has been tested mainly with regard to limitation or exclusion of liability clauses, 
but it has been suggested that also “entire agreement” or “arbitration” clauses 
(inserted in consumer contracts) could be assessed under the doctrine, and the 
Supreme Court of Canada recently scrutinized the latter in Uber v. Heller83, as we 
 
(81) French original wording: “Toute clause qui prive de sa substance l'obligation essentielle du 
débiteur est réputée non écrite”. 
(82) J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 831-832. 
(83) J. D. MCCAMUS, The Law of Contracts, cit., 443-444. 
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have seen above. 
But it is the second issue that raises more concerns. In particular, a 
material question «relates to the role, if any, of a doctrine of severance in the context of 
the unconscionable term analysis. (…) in order to determine whether the entire 
agreement should be struck down or, alternatively, whether the offending clause can be 
deleted and the remainder of the agreement enforced».84 
As a civil law scholar, I may concur with the concerns raised above, but I 
can add that, on this issue, the civil law tradition has a quite better position in 
dealing with these problems.  
When a standard term is excised by civil law courts - using a variety of 
legal tools (such as the lack of cause, or the barring of unfair terms) having the 
same aim as the Canadian unconscionable terms doctrine - there is less room, in 
civil law, for concerns about potential unfairness of the remainder of the 
agreement, absent the unfair term: whenever an unbalance of such kind is 
ascertained, civil codes provide solid guidance to courts for maintaining the 
remainder of the agreement with “supplementary” rules, filling the gap by a fair 
and balanced set of rights and obligations. 
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